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A security design model shows that multinational ﬁrms needing to ﬁnance
their operations should issue diﬀerent securities to investors in diﬀerent
countries in order to aggregate their disparate information about domes-
tic and foreign cash ﬂows. However, if the ﬁrm becomes bankrupt, investors
may face uncertain costs of reorganizing assets in a foreign country and thus
may value foreign assets at their average value. This penalizes superior ﬁrms
with low reorganization costs. Such ﬁrms minimize the adverse selection
penalty by designing securities that allocate all the cash ﬂow in bankruptcy
to investors for which the adverse selection costs are the smallest given the
exchange rate. We show that this sharing rule can be implemented with
currency swaps because these instruments allow the priorities of claims in
bankruptcy to switch depending on the exchange rate.I. Introduction
One of the long held tenets of ﬁnancial economics, dating back to the
Modigliani and Miller capital structure propositions, is that in a perfect
capital market, the precise packaging and marketing of securities is irrele-
vant. However, the practice of ﬁnance since the 1980’s is largely noted for
the proliferation of new contractual arrangements that package securities
payoﬀs in diﬀerent ways. As Ross (1989) suggested in his presidential ad-
dress to the American Finance Association, we still do not understand why
ﬁrms go through the trouble of creating such seemingly redundant deriv-
ative assets and liabilities. Furthermore, ﬁrms often market securities to
diﬀerent clienteles and raise ﬁnancing from several diﬀerent sources even
when a single ﬁnancial intermediary may be capable of satisfying their ﬁ-
nancing requirements. In this paper, we provide a rationale for the design
and marketing of such securities by ﬁrms.
We model a situation in which diﬀerent agents possess signals about
diﬀerent components of a ﬁrm’s future aggregate cash ﬂows. Here, domes-
tic investors receive private signals about a multinational ﬁrm’s domestic
cash ﬂows and foreign investors receive private signals about its foreign cash
ﬂows. Firms with high cash ﬂows prefer full revelation of investor informa-
tion because less informed investors value uncertain cash ﬂows at their mean
values. We show that whenever a ﬁrm issues two distinct securities to the
domestic and foreign investors, equilibrium prices of the two distinct securi-
ties reveal all investor signals about domestic and foreign future cash ﬂows.
This can explain why ﬁrms issue multiple securities to multiple investors.
If bankruptcy is possible, the securities issued can be ﬁxed income securi-
ties. Our paper focuses on the optimal design of ﬁxed income securities when
future cash ﬂows and exchange rates are uncertain. The pricing of ﬁxed in-
come securities depends on the probability of bankruptcy and the payoﬀs to
ﬁxed income claimants conditional on bankruptcy. These, in turn, depend
on the joint distribution of future cash ﬂows and the future exchange rate.
As a consequence, information revelation about future cash ﬂows aﬀects the
pricing of ﬁxed income securities.
Equilibrium prices communicate investor information because investors
submit rational reservation price functions which depend on their private
information as well as the prices of securities that they observe. An “auc-
tioneer” aggregates these reservation price functions to determine equilib-
rium prices. Intuitively, investors are eﬀectively submitting conditional bids
that are not ﬁrm unless all investors know that no investor has regrets after
1observing the prices of securities. This is analogous to a domestic and a
foreign bank being more willing to jointly lend money to a multinational
ﬁrm at a small credit spread than each would be acting alone.
Full revelation of investor information in our model does not, however,
preclude informational asymmetry about the future value of assets in bank-
ruptcy which could diﬀer for domestic and foreign investors. The diﬀerences
in valuations arise because in bankruptcy, a ﬁrm’s assets may need to be
reorganized to realize their full value. It seems intuitive and natural that the
costs of reorganizing the ﬁrm’s domestic assets would be higher for foreign
investors and vice versa. Our model assumes that there are potential costs
of reorganization if domestic assets are reorganized by foreign investors and
conversely, if foreign assets are reorganized by domestic investors. Equilib-
rium prices reveal all investor information about the ﬁrm’s domestic and
foreign cash ﬂows but not the potential costs of reorganization. As a con-
sequence of the latter, the equilibrium obtained is one in which investors
pool ﬁrms with high and low reorganization costs. This pooling penalizes
the ﬁrm that has low reorganization costs. We refer to this as an adverse
selection penalty. Such a ﬁrm then has an incentive to create security in-
struments that minimize this penalty. Our main results focus on how this
ﬁrm, which is assumed to know that it has low reorganization costs, can
design securities that minimize this adverse selection penalty. Firms with
high reorganization costs will mimic this security design.
One way of dealing with this adverse selection problem is by creating
extreme securities that “spin-oﬀ” domestic and foreign assets – in bank-
ruptcy, provide no foreign assets to domestic investors and vice versa. In
this case, all investors know that domestic assets will be reorganized by do-
mestic investors and vice versa and hence, there will be no adverse selection
penalty. However, securities like this are infeasible when, because of con-
tractual, regulatory, or operational frictions, contracts must be written on
aggregate cash ﬂows from all assets, domestic and foreign; this is perhaps
the very reason the ﬁrm exists as a multinational corporation.
When contracts are written on aggregate cash ﬂows from all assets, ﬁrms
with low reorganization costs cannot avoid the adverse selection penalty be-
cause domestic investors value cash ﬂows from domestic assets at their full
value but impute an average cost associated with reorganizing foreign assets
in bankruptcy; conversely, foreign investors value cash ﬂows from foreign
assets at their full value but impute an average cost associated with re-
organizing domestic assets in bankruptcy. Optimal security design requires
that securities, in bankruptcy, minimize expected payoﬀs from foreign assets
2to domestic investors and from domestic assets to foreign investors. This
optimization problem faces constraints in that contracts on aggregate cash
ﬂows, unlike “spin-oﬀ” contracts, cannot minimize both sets of reorganiza-
tion costs independently.
Our solution to this constrained optimization problem recognizes that
one investor type – either domestic or foreign – imposes greater adverse se-
lection costs given a realized exchange rate at the time of bankruptcy. The
optimal contracts on aggregate cash ﬂows therefore are those that minimize
adverse selection costs conditional on the future exchange rate. By minimiz-
ing adverse selection costs for each realization of the future exchange rate,
such contracts also minimize the ex ante cost of adverse selection, which the
ﬁrm implicitly pays at the time of issue in the pricing of its securities.
We show that properly designed currency swaps, which are essentially
contracts whose payoﬀs are contingent on the future exchange rate, ensure
that in bankruptcy, only investors of one type, domestic or foreign, are
owed money (i.e., have positive contractual payoﬀs) when investors of the
other type owe money (i.e., have negative contractual payoﬀs) and that the
investors that are owed money are precisely the ones that impose the smaller
adverse selection costs given the future realization of exchange rate. It is
this feature that allows swaps to minimize adverse selection and dominate
seemingly identical debt contracts, even in the absence of hedging needs.
Both pari passu domestic and foreign debt, and any senior-subordinated
debt structures are always suboptimal. Unlike a pair of currency swaps,
these ﬁxed income designs do not allow the order of priority in bankruptcy to
depend on the realized exchange rate. As a consequence, ﬁnancing packages
that include properly designed currency swaps may appear to be cheaper
than those based strictly on straight debt.
Our paper makes three contributions:
 We show that ﬁrms issue distinct securities to multiple clienteles in
order to aggregate disparate investor information.
 Our results on security design are motivated by issue-cost minimiza-
tion designed to minimize adverse selection costs caused by unresolved
information asymmetries.
 We show that instruments such as currency swaps, by allowing switch-
ing of priorities in diﬀerent states in bankruptcy reorganization, can
implement a security design that minimizes adverse selection costs.
3We thus provide an explanation for the use of derivative instruments by
many corporations that is based purely on issue-cost minimization. Hedging
and risk-sharing motives play no role in our framework because our approach
assumes risk-neutrality. Consistent with our argument, a Harvard Business
School case on Walt Disney Company’s Yen Financing (Allen, 1987) points
out that the use of currency swaps is often motivated by eﬃcient ﬁnancing
considerations.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section II presents the model. Sec-
tion III derives the results. Section IV discusses related literature. Section
V concludes the paper.
II. The Model
A. The General Setup
We study the problem of a risk-neutral ﬁrm with superior information that ﬁ-
nances its operations by issuing optimally designed securities to price-taking
risk-neutral domestic and foreign investors. Speciﬁcally, consider a multina-
tional operating and issuing securities in two countries: domestic, denoted
X; and foreign, denoted Y . The ﬁrm’s projects, which require ﬁnancing of
I, generate cash ﬂows
(x + zx) + s(y + zy) + ;
where
x + zx  domestic cash ﬂows associated with country X,
y + zy  foreign cash ﬂows associated with country Y
(measured in units of foreign currency),
s  the exchange rate (which is a contractible variable),
  a noncontractible nonnegative cash ﬂow, and
  an indicator variable that takes the value one if the ﬁrm
is able to pay oﬀ its promises to security holders and
zero in the event of bankruptcy.
We shall see that because  is not contractible, it generates the possi-
bility of bankruptcy. In bankruptcy, if the ﬁrm is reorganized by domestic
investors, the foreign cash ﬂow described above is reduced by reorganiza-
tion cost zy (in foreign currency units). If the ﬁrm is reorganized by foreign
investors, the domestic cash ﬂow is reduced by reorganization cost zx; the
original management can reorganize without costs. Thus, the cash ﬂow com-
ponent, y, can be thought of as the domestic investors’ reservation value of
foreign assets (in foreign currency units) when the ﬁrm is bankrupt. Sim-
4ilarly, x can be thought of as the foreign investors’ reservation value of
domestic assets when the ﬁrm is bankrupt.
The ﬁrm’s objective is to issue claims to the cash ﬂows to maximize the
value of preexisting ownership claims (loosely referred to as “equity”) while
obtaining ﬁnancing of at least I. The sequence of events is as follows:
1. Nonnegative domestic cash ﬂow, x+zx, foreign cash ﬂow, y +zy; and
the reorganization costs, zx and zy; are determined and revealed to the
ﬁrm. Domestic investors learn x + zx. Foreign investors learn y + zy.
2. The ﬁrm designs and markets ﬁxed income securities to investors in
countries X and Y with promised payoﬀs that are contingent only on
the realized exchange rate s:1 Equilibrium prices are determined.
3. The exchange rate s and cash ﬂow shock  are determined; all agents
learn cash ﬂows, shocks and (if the ﬁrm is bankrupt) reorganization
costs.
4. The ﬁrm either pays its contractual obligations fully or goes bankrupt.
If bankrupt, it reorganizes by negotiating a settlement with ﬁxed in-
come claimants.
B. An Overview of the Main Results
In equilibrium, the ﬁrm issues two securities X and Y the prices of which
reveal x+zx and y +zy. Domestic investors, despite having inferred y +zy;
cannot distinguish a high zy, low y ﬁrm from a low zy; high y ﬁrm (similarly
for foreign investors). This gives rise to an adverse selection problem because
investors remain less informed than the ﬁrm which observes both cash ﬂows
and reorganization costs. A ﬁrm with low reorganization costs, that is zx <
E(zxjx + zx) and zy < E(zyjy + zy); receives a less than fair price for its
securities. It is penalized because domestic investors use the average value
of y and foreign investors use the average value of x to bid for the ﬁrm’s
securities.
The main result is that, in state s, it is optimal for the ﬁrm to allocate all
the cash ﬂow to either security X or security Y depending on the exchange
1Following Townsend (1979) and Diamond (1984), we assume that the nonveriﬁability
of payoﬀs make the issuance of ﬁxed income claims desirable. However, straight debt
need not be the optimal ﬁxed income security to issue here because there is a publicly
observable and veriﬁable state variable, the exchange rate s, on which contractual payoﬀs
can be made contingent.
5rate s: The optimal security design allocates the cash ﬂow in each state
to the investor-type who values it most (i.e., demands the lowest adverse
selection premium). In this way, the low reorganization cost ﬁrm minimizes
the adverse selection cost it faces, state by state. This feature of the optimal
design can be implemented by issuing currency swaps to the investors. (see
Figure 1 below). Figure 1 also demonstrates that it would be suboptimal
to issue the same security to both domestic and foreign investors since one
of the two investor-types has higher adverse selection for any realization of
the exchange rate. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we denote
X as the security that is issued to domestic investors and Y as the security
that is issued to foreign investors.
We now describe the model and the results in detail.
Figure 1 here
Fig. 1. – Cost of Adverse Selection as a function of the exchange rate s
6C. Cash Flows to Investors
The net cash ﬂow available for distribution not only depends on whether or
not the ﬁrm is bankrupt, but if it is bankrupt, on who reorganizes the ﬁrm’s
assets. Because of this feature of the model, diﬀerent investors value the
same asset diﬀerently, even though (in equilibrium), they are symmetrically
informed. The diﬀerence in valuation generates an information asymmetry
between the ﬁrm and its investors that cannot be resolved completely, but
can be mitigated by security design.
In non-bankrupt states, the ﬁrm is operated by the original managers,
and there is a bonus cash ﬂow  from the absence of the need to operate under
bankruptcy constraints.2 The total cash ﬂow in the absence of bankruptcy
is denoted by
A(s;;x + zx;y + zy)  (x + zx) + s(y + zy) + :
When the ﬁrm falls into bankruptcy, the aggregate contractual payments
on its ﬁxed income securities, denoted F(s); exceed the available cash ﬂow,
that is,
F(s) > A(s;;x + zx;y + zy):
The inability to contract on the shock  is what leads to the possibility of
bankruptcy.
We make the following distributional assumptions.
 The joint distribution of [x;zx;y;zy;s;] is common knowledge;
 [s;] is independent of [x;zx;y;zy];
 The conditional expectation functions
¯ x(x + zx)  E(xjx + zx);
¯ y(y + zy)  E(yjy + zy);
are monotonically increasing in their arguments.3
2Consistent with a long literature on bankruptcy, we assume that it is less eﬃcient to
operate the ﬁrm in bankruptcy. Titman (1984), for example, discusses how diﬃcult it
is for ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress to eﬃciently employ their existing assets. One reason is
that the optimal liquidation policy for diﬀerent ﬁnancial claimants is not the same as the
eﬃcient liquidation policy for the ﬁrm’s assets.
3This condition obtains when x and x + zx; as well as y and y + zy, are aﬃliated (i.e.,
loosely speaking, positively correlated; see Milgrom and Weber (1982), Theorem 5).
7 For any given x + zx and y + zy; there exists a ﬁrm with both the
smallest zx  0 and the smallest zy  0:
Note that since the distribution of [s;] and the securities issued by the ﬁrm
are common knowledge, so is the probability of bankruptcy if (as is indeed
the case) the equilibrium pricing of securities leads all investors to learn
x + zx and y + zy.
The ineﬃciency of bankruptcy has two aspects to it. One is a general
ineﬃciency, represented by the loss of the nonnegative : Another ineﬃciency
is represented by the potential reorganization costs of zx and zy:
Clearly, in bankruptcy, the ﬁrm cannot meet its aggregate contractually
promised payment. Hence, there must be some rule that divides up what
the ﬁrm can pay in bankruptcy to its cash ﬂow claimants. In principle, the
rule for determining the realized payoﬀs in bankrupt states need not be tied
to the promised payoﬀs. As a practical matter, however, what a cash ﬂow
claimant gets in bankruptcy is related to what he is promised. In this vein,
we assume that fractional ownership of assets by ﬁxed-income claimants in
bankruptcy is proportional to the promises made to these claimants. Let
FX(s) and FY (s); denote the promised payments to the holders of securities
X and Y respectively. Hence the fraction of the ﬁrm owned by domestic





1 if FX(s)  0;FY (s) < 0
FX(s)
FX(s)+FY (s) if FX(s)  0;FY (s)  0
0 if FX(s) < 0;FY (s)  0
For symmetry, the fraction of the ﬁrm owned by foreign investors in bank-
ruptcy is fY (s) = 1  fX(s). When bankruptcy occurs in our model,
s;x;zx;y; and zy are revealed, and negotiations go on between the man-
agers and the senior claimants over the payment owed to the claimants.
Because domestic investors incur costs in reorganizing foreign assets, they
have a reservation value of fX(s)[(x + zx) + sy] for their claim which is less
than the full value fX(s)[(x + zx) + s(y + zy)] obtained when assets are
reorganized by the existing management. Similarly foreign investors have
a reservation value of fY (s)[x + s(y + zy)] which is less than the full value
fY (s)[(x + zx) + s(y + zy)]:4
4The dead weight losses associated with the costly reorganization of assets by ﬁxed-
income investors suggests a rationale for why absolute priority is often violated in practice.
Reorganizations and debt restructurings occur in bankruptcy, which allow equity holders
8We assume for notational simplicity and without loss of generality that
all of the bargaining power in bankruptcy negotiations belongs to the equity-
maximizing managers. Hence, equity-maximizing managers can reorganize
the ﬁrm by paying the reservation values
CX  fX(s)f(x + zx) + syg
to domestic investors and
CY  [1  fX(s)]fx + s(y + zy)g
to foreign investors and keeping the rent
fX(s)szy + [1  fX(s)]zx
for equity holders.
D. The Equilibrium
The mechanism for market clearing in this model is one where investors
announce reservation price schedules which are nontrivial functions of both
their private information and market prices.5 These reservation price sched-
ule can be viewed as a number of rational and competitive conditional bids.
Price is determined by an “auctioneer” to clear the announced reservation
price schedules.
It may be useful to picture a real-world analogy. Consider an investment
bank using its sales force to shop among partially informed investors for the
best deal for a corporate client. It oﬀers a security to domestic investors,
to maintain a measure of control of the ﬁrm. In the United States, for example, Chapter
11 bankruptcy involves a reorganization of the ﬁrm as an operating entity.
5The requirement that reservation price schedules be nontrivial functions of private
information resolves a paradox in the rational expectations literature – speciﬁcally, how
the market can know private information when investors have equilibrium strategies that
do not depend on private information. Beja (1976) ﬁrst noted that some models that use
the standard Rational Expectations Equilibrium as their equilibrium deﬁnition exhibit
this fundamental paradox; see also Radner (1977). Admati (1989) provides an intuitive
discussion of this and related issues. An alternative resolution of the paradox is to in-
troduce noise traders, as in Hellwig (1980) and Kyle (1989), among others. This has the
advantage of also explaining the incentive to acquire information, along with resolving
Beja’s paradox. We employ a variation of the noise trader assumption in our model when
we assume uncertain reorganization costs. Thus, except for degenerate parameter values,
the existence of uncertain reorganization costs obviates the need for the requirement that
demand be sensitive to private information; demand will generally have this property in
our model.
9informs them that it will also be oﬀering another security to foreign investors,
and asks domestic investors what they will price the security for. Domestic
investors return a price quote. This price quote is not ﬁrm until domestic
investors see foreign investors’ price for their security and it is common
knowledge that both sets of investors are satisﬁed with their quotes knowing
each other’s quotes. The bank then approaches foreign investors and enters
into an analogous negotiation. This process may iterate back and forth as
the investment bank shuttles pricing information back and forth between
the two investor-types until an equilibrium pair of prices is reached where
all investors know that no investors have regrets. This description of the
negotiations between diﬀerent parties is similar to Allen (1987)’s description
of negotiations between Walt Disney, Goldman Sachs, a French utility, and
a Japanese ﬁnancial intermediary about the terms of a currency swap as
part of Disney’s ﬁnancing package.
III. Results
Our key results are derived in several steps. In equilibrium, the ﬁrm issues
two securities, the prices of which reveal x+zx and y+zy. To illustrate the
intuition behind full revelation, Sections III.A and III.B analyze the simpler
case in which bankruptcy occurs with probability one. To further simplify
matters, we assume in this section that FX(s) and FY (s) are nonnegative.
Domestic investors remain less informed than the ﬁrm insofar as they can
infer only y + zy while the ﬁrm observes both y +zy and zy (similarly for
foreign investors). This gives rise to an adverse selection problem for a
ﬁrm with low reorganization costs. The proﬁt of such a ﬁrm from security
issuance is shown to be increasing in the expected portion of the domestic
cash ﬂow going to the domestic investor E [fX(s)], and decreasing in the
expected portion of the foreign cash ﬂow going to the domestic investor
E [fX(s)s]. The reverse is true for the portions to the foreign investor. In
Section III.C, we relax all of the simplifying assumptions. The main result
here is that, in state s, it is optimal for the ﬁrm to allocate all the cash
ﬂow to either domestic or foreign investors depending on whether (x  ¯ x)
is above or below s(y  ¯ y) where x and y refer to values for the pool-
leading ﬁrm with the lowest reorganization costs zx and zy: We show that
this sharing rule can be implemented with currency swaps.
A. Information Aggregation
To understand information aggregation and revelation more clearly, let us
focus on the case in which  = 0; and to further simplify matters assume
10that FX(s) and FY (s) are nonnegative. Suppose that because of suﬃciently
tight bounds on s, FX(s)+FY (s) > (x+zx)+s(y+zy) with certainty. In this
case, the payoﬀs to the investors are simply what they get in bankruptcy,
which occurs with probability 1.
Let VX denote the value of security X to domestic investors under full
revelation, i.e., if investors knew both x + zx and y + zy: Then,
VX = E[fX(s)f(x + zx) + sy)gjx + zx;y + zy]
= X(x + zx) + X¯ y(y + zy)
where X  E [fX(s)] and X  E [fX(s)s]:
Similarly, let VY denote the value of security Y to foreign investors under
full revelation. Then,
VY = E[fY (s)fx + s(y + zy))gjx + zx;y + zy]
= Y ¯ x(x + zx) + Y (y + zy)
where Y  E [fY (s)] and Y  E [fY (s)s]:
Note that X + Y = 1 and X + Y = E(s).
Let gX(PY jx + zx) denote the reservation price schedule for security X
by domestic investors who privately observe x + zx but also condition on
the price for the other security PY : Similarly, we let gY (PXjy + zy) denote
the reservation price schedule for security Y by foreign investors. For these
reservation price schedules to be rational, they must be consistent with fully
revealing prices. In other words, if PX and PY were replaced by values
of these securities under full revelation, rational reservation price schedules
must give the value of these respective securities. The rationality conditions
can then be written as,
VX = gX(VY jx + zx);
VY = gY (VXjy + zy):
The only solution for the reservation price schedules satisfying the above
rationality conditions is6
gX(PY jx + zx) = X(x + zx) + X¯ y





gY (PXjy + zy) = Y ¯ x

PX  X¯ y(y + zy)
X

+ Y (y + zy):
6The proof of this is trivial. Assume that the g functions are those speciﬁed plus two
separate arbitrary functions, hX(:jx + zx); hY (:jy + zy), respectively. The solution of the
two rationality conditions would then imply that each of the h functions are identically
zero.
11Remark 1 When the ﬁrm issues security X to domestic investors and se-
curity Y to foreign investors, the equilibrium conditions
PX = gX(PY jx + zx);
PY = gY (PXjy + zy)
generate fully revealing prices with
PX = X(x + zx) + X¯ y(y + zy);
PY = Y ¯ x(x + zx) + Y (y + zy):
Proof: See the Appendix.
It is because the two securities are diﬀerent in bankruptcy that prices
reveal private information. Securities can diﬀer here for two reasons. First, if
X
X 6= Y
Y , the securities have diﬀerent relative sensitivities to the domestic
and foreign cash ﬂow components. Second, reorganization costs generate
an asymmetry in the payoﬀs of these securities to domestic and foreign
investors.
If reorganization costs were zero and if X
X = Y
Y ; the two securities
would be identical and the reservation price schedules would be insensitive
to investors’ private information. To demonstrate this, note that in this
case, the reservation price schedules characterized above degenerate to
gX(PY jx) = Xx +
X
Y











Notice here that reservation price schedules of both domestic and foreign in-
vestors are insensitive to their private information. Although a non-market
mechanism, such as a direct revelation mechanism in which investors cred-
ibly announce their private signals to each other, could uncover the hidden
information, our view is that a market mechanism is limited to revelation
of reservation price schedules, and since private information is not reﬂected
in such schedules it cannot be reﬂected in market equilibrium prices.
This example reﬂects the key role of security diﬀerentiation in revealing
private information. It also illustrates why ﬁrms raise ﬁnancing from several
diﬀerent sources even when a single ﬁnancial intermediary may be capable
of satisfying the ﬁnancing requirements of any given ﬁrm.
B. Uncertainty, Adverse Selection, and the Implications for Security Design
12In this section, we show that optimal security design requires that securities,
in bankruptcy, minimize expected payoﬀs from foreign assets to domestic in-
vestors and from domestic assets to foreign investors. This mitigates adverse
selection arising from residual information asymmetry between the ﬁrm and
its investors. We continue to consider the case in which the ﬁrm is bankrupt
with probability one.
Notice that even when all investor information is revealed, the informa-
tion advantage of the issuing ﬁrm relative to its investors is not eliminated.
For example, foreign investors observing a high price for a security X issued
to domestic investors cannot distinguish between a high value of x and a
high zx. Thus, foreign investors must pool ﬁrms with high x’s and low zx’s
together with ﬁrms that have low x’s and high zx’s in formulating the func-
tion ¯ x(x + zx): As we show below, the ﬁrms with high reorganization costs
beneﬁt by being in the pool and get favorable pricing on the securities they
issue to foreign investors. The ﬁrms with low reorganization costs receive
unfair pricing on securities issued to foreign investors. They will do anything
they can to either break out of the pool or to alter the composition of the
intrinsic security values in the pool so that their securities pricing is not so
disadvantageous. This, as we will show, is accomplished via security design.
The low x high zx ﬁrms will remain in the pool by mimicking the high x low
zx ﬁrms’ security design. In this pooling equilibrium, all ﬁrms issue the same
securities. (A similar argument applies to domestic investors observing the
price of security Y issued to foreign investors.) This suggests that security
design is dictated by the preferences of ﬁrm types with x > ¯ x(x + zx) and
y > ¯ y(y+zy), i.e., ﬁrms with low reorganization costs, who, in eﬀect, ﬁnance
their projects at unfavorable rates.
To show that the design of the securities issued aﬀects the ﬁnancing
revenue for ﬁrms with low reorganization costs, observe that the diﬀerence
between revenue and cost from security issuance for these ﬁrms is7
PX  CX = [X(x + zx) + X¯ y(y + zy)]  [X(x + zx) + Xy];
PY  CY = [Y ¯ x(x + zx) + Y (y + zy)]  [Y x + Y (y + zy)];
Substituting the adding up constraints,
X + Y = 1;
7Note that in this example, we are ignoring the ﬁnancing constraint, revenue of at least
I, and focusing on what maximizes the proﬁt to preexisting claimants from auctioning oﬀ
the ﬁrm. This is necessary because the example assumes that the ﬁrm is always bankrupt,
which constrains the amount of revenue raised.
13X + Y = E(s);
into the equations above implies
P  C = [PX + PY ]  [CX + CY ]
= [fx  ¯ x(x + zx)g + E(s)fy  ¯ y(y + zy)g]
+Xfx  ¯ x(x + zx)g + Y fy  ¯ y(y + zy)g:
Notice that the ﬁrm’s aggregate proﬁt in this fully revealing equilibrium
equals PC, and is increasing in X and Y for ﬁrms for which x > ¯ x(x+zx)
and y > ¯ y(y + zy): A high value of X and a low value of X reduces the
adverse selection faced by pool-leading ﬁrms. If the contracts were not
constrained to be written on aggregate cash ﬂows, the ﬁrm could eliminate
adverse selection by choosing X = 1 and X = 0 which essentially spins
oﬀ domestic assets to domestic investors and, by the adding up constraint,
foreign assets to foreign investors. However, since X = E[fX(s)] and X =
E[fX(s)s], X and X are related to one another. This relation makes the
security design problem, i.e., the choice of fX(s), more complex than simply
maximizing X and minimizing X. In the next section, we will analyze the
optimal security design, accounting for this constraint.
C. Optimal Security Design
In the case we have analyzed so far, we assumed that the ﬁrm was always
bankrupt. Here, we relax this assumption and analyze the optimal security
design. Note that in contrast to the previous examples, we also allow FX(s)
and FY (s) to be negative. To simplify notation, let F denote F(s) which
equals FX(s) + FY (s), let A denote A(s;;x + zx;y + zy), let ¯ x denote
¯ x(x + zx); and let ¯ y denote ¯ y(y + zy): Note that if FX(s) < 0 or FY (s) < 0
in bankruptcy (implying one is positive), there will be a transfer payment
between investors holding security X and those holding security Y . Thus, in
addition to out of bankruptcy payments, bankrupt states in which transfers
occur will add an additional term to the expressions for the prices of the two
securities given in the previous example. However, such a transfer payment
does not aﬀect the aggregate proceeds, P, of the ﬁrm’s securities issuance.
To simplify notation further, let
14NB  the set of non-bankrupt states[A  F],
B  the set of states where the ﬁrm is bankrupt [A < F],
T  a subset of B consisting of transfer payment states where
the ﬁrm owes money to investors holding security X and
is owed money byinvestors holding security Y or vice versa
[FX(s) < 0 or FY (s) < 0 but not both],
Ek  the expectation conditional on being in set k;
k  the probability of being in set k:
As in the previous examples, the pricing of two distinct securities reveal
the private information signals x + zx and y + zy:
Remark 2 When the ﬁrm issues security X to domestic investors and se-
curity Y to foreign investors, the equilibrium conditions
PX = gX(PY jx + zx)
PY = gY (PXjy + zy)
generate fully revealing prices with
PX = KX + X(x + zx) + X¯ y(y + zy);














ENB[FX(s)] + TET[min(0;FX(s)) + max(0;FY (s))];
KY  
NB
ENB[FY (s)] + TET[max(0;FX(s)) + min(0;FY (s))]:
Proof: See the Appendix.
Note that, in bankruptcy, the ﬁrm is buying its assets back at the reser-
vation prices of domestic and foreign investors, leaving a surplus for equity
holders. Thus, the equity holders of the ﬁrm have cash not only in non-
bankrupt states, but also in bankrupt states because absolute priority is
violated in our reorganizational-type bankruptcy. Speciﬁcally, equity value,







[fX(s)f(x + zx) + s¯ yg + f1  fX(s)gf¯ x + s(y + zy)g];




plus the value of the cash ﬂows from the assets ﬁnanced by investing I
accounting for the dead weight loss of bankruptcy (given the ﬁrm’s infor-
mation),











[fX(s)f(x + zx) + syg + f1  fX(s)gfx + s(y + zy)g];




= 1, simpliﬁes to
W = P  I + J  C




[ + fX(s)s(y  ¯ y) + f1  fX(s)g(x  ¯ x)]
Observe that the ﬁrst two terms, E(A) and I; are unaﬀected by security
design and that the third term captures both the dead weight cost of bank-
ruptcy  and a pair of terms representing adverse selection costs faced by
ﬁrms with low reorganization costs. Thus, for such ﬁrms, equity value is
increased whenever a security design reduces the value of the dead weight
loss from bankruptcy’s eﬀect on operations
BEB()
or reduces the adverse selection penalty
BE
B
[fX(s)s(y  ¯ y) + f1  fX(s)g (x  ¯ x)]:
Thus, there are two relatively independent means for increasing equity value
by security design. Eﬀectively lowering the number of bankrupt states by
reducing F(s) for some states (still raising at least I) reduces both the
dead weight loss and the adverse selection component. The solution to
the optimal F(s) is distribution dependent and generally intractable. The
second instrument for increasing equity value is the sharing rule for the ﬁxed
income claimants, which aﬀects the conditional expectation multiplicand
E
B
[fX(s)s(y  ¯ y) + f1  fX(s)g(x  ¯ x)]:
16but does not aﬀect the probability of bankruptcy, B: In the following propo-
sition, we show that this conditional expectation is minimized and thus the
maximum equity value is attained with a security design that has the sharing
rule described below:
Proposition 1 The maximum equity value of a ﬁrm with low reorganization
costs is achieved for a security design with fX(s) = 1 in states where x¯ x >
s(y  ¯ y), and fX(s) = 0 otherwise.
Proof: First, hold F ﬁxed, which determines the set of bankrupt states.




[fX(s)s(y  ¯ y) + f1  fX(s)g(x  ¯ x)]:





when (x  ¯ x) > s(y  ¯ y)
otherwise.
Since this feature maximizes equity value for each candidate F(s), it maxi-
mizes equity value at the optimal F(s) as well.
Firms with high reorganization costs will mimic the security designs of
low reorganization ﬁrms lest they be identiﬁed as high reorganization cost
ﬁrms. Such ﬁrms sell their securities at a higher price by being in a pool
with ﬁrms that have low reorganization costs.9
Proposition 1 shows that the proceeds from bankrupt states are maxi-
mized by minimizing adverse selection on a state by state basis, where states
are deﬁned by the realized exchange rate. Alternatively, this can be viewed
as writing a state-contingent contract that allocates each state contingent
cash ﬂow to claimants who value it the most. Obviously, two pari passu debt
contracts, e.g., foreign and domestic debt, cannot be optimal because bank-
ruptcy proceeds are shared. Also, senior and junior debt are suboptimal
because they cannot reverse priority contingent on s.
D. Security Design and Currency Swaps
In this subsection, we analyze simpliﬁed representations of currency swaps.
A currency swap to domestic investors contractually obligates the ﬁrm to
9Note that all ﬁrms in the pool have the same probability of bankruptcy because their
aggregate cash ﬂows are identical and they issue identical securities.
17pay nX units of domestic currency to them and in return they are obligated
to pay rXnX in foreign currency to the ﬁrm.10 Clearly, if rX = 0, the
instrument is domestic debt with face value nX. Similarly, a currency swap
issued to foreign investors contractually obligates the ﬁrm to pay nY units
of foreign currency to them and in return they are obligated to pay rY nY
units of domestic currency to the ﬁrm. Here, rY = 0 represents foreign debt.
In general, for positive values of rX and rY ; these instruments represent
currency swap contracts. In bankruptcy, each swap has a pari passu claim
in proportion to its contractually promised payment.11
Using the notation of the previous subsection, this means
FX(s)  nX(1  srX);
FY (s)  nY (s  rY ):
For any given domestic and foreign cash ﬂow pair, x + zx and y + zy,
let x and y denote the reservation values of domestic and foreign assets in
bankruptcy by foreign and domestic investors respectively for the ﬁrm with
lowest reorganization costs, i.e., the pool-leading ﬁrm.
Proposition 2 Two currency swaps with nX and nY positive, one issued




x  ¯ x
y  ¯ y
 r





when (x  ¯ x) > s(y  ¯ y)
otherwise.
10A plain vanilla currency swap involves the exchange of the cash ﬂows of a domestic
bond for the cash ﬂows of a foreign bond. The bonds may be ﬁxed or ﬂoating. Both
interest and principal are typically exchanged. There may even be an exchange of cash
for foreign currency at the initiation of the swap.
11Traditional analyses have ignored the default risk inherent in these contracts (although
Cooper and Mello (1991) and Litzenberger (1992) are notable exceptions). Solnik (1994)
notes that ﬁrms with default risk are charged a markup over the market swap prices that
are determined (and quoted) using traditional methods that ignore default risk considera-
tions. Because default risk is critical to our motivation for swaps, the model in this paper
is designed to explain the currency swap market between corporations and banks, as op-
posed to the marked-to-market swap market, which operates more like a futures market,
that almost exclusively involves money center banks and investment banks.
18Proof: If s < rY = x¯ x
y¯ y , FX(s) > 0 and FY (s) < 0 and in bankruptcy
fX(s) = 1 and x  ¯ x > y  ¯ y. The complementary case is symmetric.
Propositions 1 and 2 describe securities that minimize adverse selec-
tion for the pool-leading ﬁrm. Optimally designed securities, according to





when (x  ¯ x) > s(y  ¯ y)
otherwise.
which, trivially, is generated by promised claims for which
FX(s) =
(




nonpositive number when x  ¯ x > s(y  ¯ y)
positive number otherwise.
Proposition 2 illustrates that this feature of an optimal security is shared by
two properly designed currency swaps. Since nX and nY are positive, these
swaps pay domestic currency to domestic investors in exchange for foreign
currency and vice versa for foreign investors. Moreover, since 1
rX = rY = r;
the swaps’ rates of currency exchange at settlement are identical. This
implies that the ﬁrm receives cash for entering into one of the two swaps
and pays cash for entering into the other. The scale of the swaps is set
so as to generate the required ﬁnancing I: Such currency swaps possess this
optimality feature irrespective of the ratio of the notional amounts of the two
swaps nX
nY : The ratio nX
nY does however aﬀect the probability of bankruptcy.
In general, optimal security design must consider the probability of bank-
ruptcy as well as the cash ﬂow allocation rules in bankruptcy simultaneously.
The bankruptcy boundary is determined by the promised aggregate contrac-
tual payment F = FX(s) + FY (s), and a detailed description of optimal se-
curities is not possible without making speciﬁc assumptions about the joint
distribution of s and . Consequently, we cannot assert that the optimal
F can be implemented with a pair of currency swaps. However, it is pos-
sible to show that currency swaps dominate debt without making further
distributional assumptions.
Proposition 3 Any pair of debt contracts as well as any pairing of a cur-
rency swap with debt is dominated by a pair of currency swaps.
19Proof: See the Appendix.
A general conclusion we draw from the model is that securities should
be designed so as to minimize the penalty from adverse selection. As seen in
Figure 1, the cost of adverse selection is a weighted average of two lines — the
horizontal line represents x  ¯ x and the 45 degree line represents s(y  ¯ y)
— corresponding to whether foreign or domestic investors, respectively, own
the ﬁrm’s assets in bankruptcy. It is obvious from Figure 1 that two debt
contracts, represented by the curved line in Figure 1, do not minimize the
cost of adverse selection. However, the pair of currency swaps described
in Proposition 3 generate adverse selection costs at the minimum of the
horizontal and the 45 degree lines. The exchange rate at which these two
lines cross represents x¯ x
y¯ y  r:
IV. Related Literature
The role of standard securities like debt and equity in the ﬁnancing of real
investments has been explored in a rapidly burgeoning literature on security
design.12 However, only recently has research in ﬁnancial economics begun
to address why seemingly trivial packagings of securities are so popular. One
of the earliest papers on security design is by Allen and Gale (1988) who
show that when it is costly to issue securities and when diﬀerent groups of
investors place diﬀerent values on the same security, optimal securities split
up the ﬁrm’s state-contingent cash ﬂows, allocating all cash ﬂow in a given
state to the investor who values it the most. Madan and Soubra (1991)
introduce marketing costs into the Allen and Gale model and show that
the sharing of cash ﬂow in several states may be optimal in the presence
of marketing costs. Ross (1989) also explores the implications of marketing
costs and shows that ﬁnancial innovation can reduce the costs of marketing
securities; Pesendorfer (1995) generalizes this result to a general equilibrium
framework. Boot and Thakor (1993) argue that selling multiple ﬁnancial
claims partitions a ﬁrm’s total cash ﬂow into “informationally sensitive” and
“informationally insensitive” components. This encourages the acquisition
of information by investors, which enhances ﬁrm revenue.
Similar to our paper, Ohashi (1995) also considers a situation in which
diﬀerent investors have private information on diﬀerent sources of uncer-
tainty and argues that the introduction of properly designed securities may
symmetrize the investors’ information. Whether, in equilibrium, such secu-
rities are issued or not depends on the objective of the issuer. If the issuer is
12See Allen and Gale (1994), Allen and Winton (1995), and Duﬃe and Rahi (1995) for
recent surveys of literature on security design.
20a volume maximizing futures exchange, it may choose not to issue these se-
curities, or as in Marin and Rahi (1996), limit the number of such securities
issued. Consequently, the market may remain incomplete and equilibrium
prices may not be fully revealing. In our model, it is the ﬁrm that decides
to issue securities to minimize the impact of adverse selection on revenues
raised.
Most related to our work are the models of Rahi (1996) and DeMarzo
and Duﬃe (1999), which analyze the eﬀect of adverse selection when issuing
ﬁrms possess superior information. Rahi (1996) uses an exponential-normal
rational expectations framework to study security design. He shows that
within the joint normal class (which rules out risky debt securities), ﬁrms
prefer to issue an information-free security, such as pure equity, that does not
exploit the ﬁrm’s information advantage. DeMarzo and Duﬃe (1999) study
the impact of adverse selection on security design in a setting in which agents
are risk-neutral. In their model, the signal from the quantity issued generates
a downward sloping convex demand curve for the security. They then show
that the design of securities like Collaterized Mortgage Obligations allows
intermediaries to retain the portion of the security’s return for which adverse
selection, due to private information, is greatest, thereby mitigating the
eﬀect of adverse selection on revenues collected.
While prior research has developed general principles of security design
and a handful of papers has tried to broadly link theoretical results on design
to the existence of derivatives, we are not aware of any paper that speciﬁcally
motivates currency swaps as an outcome of optimal security design.
V. Conclusion
This paper has argued that diﬀerent groups of investors may be asymmet-
rically informed about diﬀerent components of the cash ﬂows generated by
ﬁrms. For instance, a bank in a given country may be as informed as the ﬁrm
about a multinational ﬁrm’s costs and revenues in that country. However,
the bank may be less informed than the ﬁrm about its costs and revenues
from operations in other countries. In this case, ﬁrms face an adverse selec-
tion problem if foreign cash ﬂows aﬀect the value of the bank’s claims on
the ﬁrm. We have shown that issuing two distinct ﬁxed income securities
to the domestic and foreign investors allows investors to credibly transmit
their private information to each other. While this facilitates eﬃcient ﬁ-
nancing, it may not resolve all of the information advantage the ﬁrm has.
To mitigate the adverse selection problem caused by unresolved information
asymmetries, it is optimal to issue swap-like derivatives which have the fea-
21ture that, in each bankrupt state, only one type of cash ﬂow claimant – the
one facing the least amount of adverse selection given the exchange rate –
owns all of the ﬁrm’s assets. Properly designed currency swaps ensure that
in bankruptcy, only one investor–type – domestic or foreign – owes money
when the other is owed money and that the investor that is owed money is
precisely the one that faces the smaller adverse selection costs given the ex-
change rate. It is this feature of switching the ordering of priority, depending
on the realized exchange rate in bankruptcy, that allows swaps to minimize
adverse selection costs and dominate seemingly identical debt contracts.
Our model did not make use of risk aversion and hedging needs to mo-
tivate the purchase of derivative securities. This does not fundamentally
alter our results and indeed strengthens many of them since we are able to
show that ﬁrms may issue securities such as currency swaps based purely on
issue-cost minimization considerations. We believe that this also sheds light
on the behavior of many corporations that issue derivative securities of var-
ious types when a motive based purely on risk-management considerations
seems implausible.
22Appendix
Proof of Remark 1
Substituting the given g functions in the pricing relations
PX = gX(PY jx + zx);
PY = gY (PXjy + zy)
we obtain
PX = X(x + zx) + X¯ y





PY = Y ¯ x

PX  ¯ y(y + zy)
X

+ Y (y + zy): (2)
Substituting (2) into (1) yields
PX = X(x+zx)+X¯ y







PX  X¯ y(y + zy)
X

 ¯ x(x + zx)

:
Subtracting X(x + zx) + X¯ y(y + zy) from both sides, we get











PX  X¯ y(y + zy)
X

 ¯ x(x + zx)









PX  X¯ y(y + zy)
X






mXmY [PX  fX(x + zx) + X¯ y(y + zy)g]
where mX and mY are given by the mean value theorem.
Rearranging, we get






For nondegenerate cases, 0 6= 1. Therefore,
PX = X(x + zx) + X¯ y(y + zy);
23which, upon substitution into (2) implies that
PY = Y ¯ x(x + zx) + Y (y + zy):
Proof of Remark 2
We write down, as before, the individual rationality conditions,
KX + X(x + zx) + X¯ y(y + zy) = gX(KY + Y ¯ x(x + zx) + Y (y + zy)jx;zx);
KY + Y ¯ x(x + zx) + Y (y + zy) = gY (KX + X(x + zx) + X¯ y(y + zy)jy;zy):
for which the only solution is
gX(PY jx + zx) = KX + X(x + zx) + X¯ y





gY (PXjy + zy) = KY + Y ¯ x

PX  KY  X¯ y(y + zy)
X

+ Y (y + zy):
Substituting the given g functions in the pricing relations
PX = gX(PY jx + zx);
PY = gY (PXjy + zy)
and solving and simplifying as in the proof of Remark 1, we obtain the
desired result.
Proof of Proposition 3
We show this by proving that a pair of currency swaps alone (not neces-
sarily the pair described in Proposition 1) can achieve the same bankruptcy
boundary as the design involving debt and yet realize lower adverse selection
costs for each realization of s.
We ﬁrst note that a pair of swaps promising nX(1  srX) to domestic
investors and nY (srY ) to foreign investors with the swap rates rX or rY or
both set to zero (i.e., debt) has the same s-contingent bankruptcy boundary
for any realization of  as a pair of swaps with swap rates RX and RY that
are closer to 1=r and r, respectively. The respective notional amounts for
the alternative design that achieves this are
NX =




nY (1  RXrY ) + nX(RX  rX)
1  RXRY
:
There is now complete freedom to select RX and RY to reduce adverse
selection. It follows that the equity value from bankrupt states is higher
and the equity value from non-bankrupt states is the same. Hence, equity
value is larger with the alternative design than with the proposed debt-based
design.
For example, if rX = rY = 0, (two debt contracts) then, letting all




nX + nY s

> 0;
set RX = 0 and RY > 0 but small. In this case, the portion of equity value
that is aﬀected by security design is
E[fX(s)(r  s)] = Pr(s  RY )EsRY [r  s]
+Pr(s > RY )Es>RY

r  s
nX + nY s

[nX + nY RY ];
which is increasing in RY for small RY . For the complementary case, set
RY = 0 and RX > 0 but small. In this case,
E[fX(s)(r  s)] = Pr(s  1=RX)Es1=RX

r  s
nX + nY s

[nX(1  sRX)];
which is increasing in RX for small RX.
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